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It is commendable that this result, desirable in itself, was achieved
by a rule extending a right to a jury trial where the penalty is to be
more severe. As long as the judiciary does not seriously abuse its contempt discretion, the trend in both the courts and the legislature of
providing limited safeguards in this area should continue.
JOHN

D.

McKEY, JR.

WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE: DECLINE OF THE PRESUMPTION
THAT STATE COURTS WILL CORRECT RACIAL ABUSES
Georgia v. Rachel, 86 Sup. Ct. 1783 (1966)
The defendants, Negro and white civil rights workers, attempted
to obtain service at a privately owned restaurant in Atlanta, Georgia.
When ordered to leave by the management, the defendants refused
and were subsequently arrested. They were then indicted under a
Georgia trespass statute1 that makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to

leave the premises of another when so requested. The defendants
petitioned for removal to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia alleging that the racial discrimination
practiced by the State of Georgia would result in the denial of their
constitutional rights. The federal district court found that the petition did not allege facts sufficient to sustain removal under the
applicable federal statute2 and remanded the case to the state court.
The circuit court of appeals reversed the district court 3 and on
appeal by the State of Georgia, the United States Supreme Court
HELD, the defendant's allegations, if true, required that the case
be removed to the federal district court. Judgment affirmed.
1. GA. CODE ANN. §26-3005 (1965).
2. 28 U.S.C. §1443 (1) (1964).
3. Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (1965).
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The Federal Removal Statute,4 under which this case arose, is a
direct descendant of a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 5
That provision, and the present removal statute, authorize the removal of a case from a state court to a federal district court when
the defendants are able to show that they will be denied in the state
courts a right specifically guaranteed by federal law. 6 The United
States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions from 1880 to 1906,
interpreted this provision to mean that the right, allegedly denied,
must be a right within the context of racial equality. 7 In addition,
the Court required conclusive evidence that the right in question
would be denied in the state courts. Because of a presumption that
any discrimination would be corrected by the state courts,s the defendant had to prove that the state would not or could not correct
the alleged discrimination. And because removal was sought before
trial, the presumption in favor of the state could be overcome only
by indicating that the state court would be bound by a statute or
constitutional provision purporting to deny the defendant a right
guaranteed by federal law.9 If the defendant could not show that
there was a state law that violated his rights, he could not have his
case removed to a federal court.' 0 The clear violation of a defendant's
rights by administrative or enforcement officials did not aid him because of the presumption that the state courts would correct such
discrimination, in the absence of discriminatory state law.'1
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court adhered strictly to this
presumption in favor of the state courts. In one case, removal was
denied on the ground that the state statute in question had recently
been declared unconstitutional by the state court of appeals and that
this decision would be binding on the state court that was trying the
defendant's case. 12 Another case that adhered even more strictly to
the presumption concerned a state constitutional provision that violated the rights of the defendant. 3 The Supreme Court denied removal on the ground that the provision had been voided by passage of
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and, therefore, was not, binding on the state court.
4. 28 U.S.C. §1443 (1964).
5. 14 Stat. 27.
6. 28 U.S.C. §1443 (1) (1964).
7. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Bush v. Kentucky, 107
U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Virginia v. Rives, note 7 supra.
Ibid.
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882).
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
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This narrow construction of the removal provision of the 1866
Civil Rights Act is applied to the present removal statute. 14 In order
to have his case removed from a state court to a federal court a defendant must prove, first, that he has a right which is specifically
guaranteed to him by federal law; second, that the state court in
which he is being prosecuted will not or cannot recognize his federal
right because of a binding and discriminatory state law; and third,
that the alleged denial of his federal right is within a racial context. 15
When the instant case arose, the defendants could not meet the
necessary requirements to have their case removed to a federal court.
They could point to no specific federal law that gave them the right
to refuse to leave a privately owned restaurant. While the case was
pending on appeal to the circuit court of appeals, the 1964 Civil
Rights Act' 6 was passed. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
handed down a decision holding that the 1964 Civil Rights Act precluded state trespass prosecutions for peaceful attempts to be served
upon an equal basis in establishments covered by that act. 17 The
result of the decision was that the defendants could now point to a federal right not to leave the restaurant and a federal right not to be
prosecuted for refusing to leave. In addition, the defendants were
being prosecuted under a state statute that violated the federal statute.
Because the prosecution itself showed that the defendants were
being denied a federal right by a state court, which was bound by
statute to deny that right, and the denial was in the context of racial
discrimination, removal of the case to a federal court was authorized.
The Supreme Court therefore authorized removal to a federal
court only after ascertaining that all the requirements for removal
had been met. A federal right was involved, a state statute was invoked to deny that right, and the entire prosecution was within a
racial context. In applying those requirements, however, the Court
apparently ignored the reason that the requirements had been first
enunciated. The Supreme Court had, in the last century, developed
those criteria for removal because, if met, they would overcome the
presumption that the state courts would correct any racial discrimination. In Georgia that presumption was apparently valid. A year
before the principal case was decided the Georgia Supreme Court
decided a case in which the facts were almost identical.' 8 The Georgia
court held that the charges had to be dismissed for the same reasons
that the United States Supreme Court had authorized removal in
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Georgia v. Rachel, 86 Sup. Ct. 1783, 1786 (1966).
Ibid.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000 (a) (1964).
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
Bolton v. State, 140 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 1965).
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the present case. The decision of the Georgia court would have been
binding on a lower state court trying the defendants in the principal
case so that the charges against them would had to have been dismissed.
The instant decision appears to undermine the presumption that
state courts will correct racial discrimination. The traditional requirements for removal, however, still exist as evidenced by both the
present case and another case decided the same day.' 9 The latter case
involved prosecutions stemming from civil rights demonstrations. The
Supreme Court remanded that case to the state courts because the
defendants could show no specific federal right to demonstrate.
Therefore, although the traditional requirements for removal still
must be met, removal will be granted without consideration whether
it was necessary as a measure to insure eventual protection of the defendant's civil rights. The apparent result of this decision is that
state courts will be afforded less opportunity to consider civil rights
abuses.
On the other hand, federal removal as expanded by the principal
decision provides an effective means of protecting civil rights that
may be denied by state law. In addition, the possibility of lengthy
and expensive litigation in the state courts has been reduced. Federal
district courts are able to make initial determinations as to the validity
of civil rights prosecutions when federal law clearly controls.
KENNETH F. TWOROGER

JOHN J. UPCHURCH

19. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 86 Sup. Ct. 1800 (1966).
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